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INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY: 
SLOVENIA’S CATALYST FOR  
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Briana Gardell
Introduction 
 Information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) could be the catalyst for econom-
ic growth in Slovenia. ICT is a broadly encom-
passing field that refers to communication of 
information through electronic devices (ICT). 
Consider a smartphone: the device itself, the 
service plan, and the apps are all a part of ICT. 
The evolution of ICT allows people, for exam-
ple, to transfer money via text, register a busi-
ness online in minutes at home, automatically 
pay bills, and video chat with people around 
the world. These technologies are changing the 
way individuals, businesses, and governments 
communicate and interact effectively, creating 
an environment coined an “information soci-
ety” (“World Telecommunication…” 2006). 
ICT offers benefits to industry, such as improv-
ing production and distribution efficiencies 
and reducing business transaction costs. Stud-
ies have found positive correlations between 
the strength of a country’s information society 
and its economic growth (Li and Xu).
 The purpose of this article is to analyze 
Slovenia’s strengths and weaknesses in ICT. 
ICT is highly correlated with economic growth. 
If Slovenia is able to increase its ICT competen-
cy, it could propagate growth throughout the 
entire country. ICT is essentially a visible tar-
get in the large complex web of stimulants to 
economic growth. ICT could be the catalyst for 
economic growth in Slovenia because Slove-
nia, formerly a leader in ICT, has retained some 
of its past competencies. Remnants of a leading 
ICT society still nestle in crevasses of Slovenia’s 
business and academic environments, but Slo-
venia is not on a par with highly ranked digital 
countries. Slovenia’s current deficiencies in 
ICT—low levels of infrastructure and low us-
age—are linked to the lack of competition in 
subsections of the ICT sector. By analyzing its 
current position, I argue that Slovenia could 
strategically fix its weaknesses by breaking 
up its original telecom monopoly, Telekom 
Slovenije, and selling its parts. Once Slovenia 
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effectively ends the monopoly and successfully 
increases infrastructure and usage, it will be 
able to leverage its current strengths to attract 
foreign investment in ICT. Investors in ICT, in 
turn, will prompt Slovenia to adopt the latest 
technologies and once again become a high- 
access digital society.
Slovenia’s Historic Competence in ICT
 Within a decade after independence, Slo-
venia had established itself as a dominant force 
in ICT. In the “World Telecommunication De-
velopment Report” of 2003, Slovenia was ranked 
in the highest category for level of access to dig-
ital technologies. This category indicated that 
Slovenia’s ICT had sufficient infrastructure and 
was affordable. Slovenia also had citizens who 
were knowledgeable of technologies, and usage 
was high. Twenty-five countries were classified 
in the highest bracket, including Sweden, Den-
mark, Korea, Norway, United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Among those top 25, Slove-
nia was the only country not classified as an 
advanced economy by the International Mone-
tary Fund. Slovenia, as a developing economy, 
was considered an outlier with a huge oppor-
tunity to leverage ICT competencies (“World 
Telecommunication…” 2003). This article 
discusses how Slovenia’s success in ICT was 
due to specific government efforts to promote 
technology through education and an environ-
ment that welcomed advancement through 
technology. 
 Slovenia’s early success in ICT was largely 
due to focused efforts to incorporate technolo-
gy into the classroom. Investing in technology 
at schools is a superb strategy to create an in-
formation society because schools reach a sig-
nificant portion of the population and devices 
at schools can be shared (“World Telecommu-
nication…” 2003). In the early 1990s, Slovenia 
launched two major initiatives to promote ICT 
in education. First, in 1992, the Slovenian gov-
ernment started to provide free Internet access 
to all schools, universities, and research insti-
tutions through the Academic and Research 
Network of Slovenia (Vehovar). Next, in 1994 
Slovenia started the Racˇunalniško Opismenje-
vanje (RO), or computer literacy, project. The 
project aimed to establish an upgrade sched-
ule for the computer equipment, to create a 
network to share educational materials, and 
to train teachers how to utilize ICT. To pro-
mote sharing, Slovenia created the Slovenian 
Education Network, which allowed teachers to 
download and upload educational resources. 
Unfortunately, the RO project officially ended 
in 1998 and was not subsequently funded (Bat-
agelj et al.). Therefore, the benefits of the RO 
project will remain within the 1990s cohort. 
A report, “The Media and Computer Literacy 
Project in Europe: The Case of Slovenia,” ex-
plains that by 2002 Slovenia should have been 
ranked among the developed European coun-
tries in the field of media and computer liter-
acy (Erjavec). In fact, Slovenia’s efforts in this 
area had propelled its early success in ICT. 
 Slovenia’s success in ICT was also influ-
enced by its high exposure to other countries 
with leading information societies. After World 
War II, Slovenia, then a part of Yugoslavia, had 
open borders with Western countries. This 
allowed Slovenes to work in countries like 
Austria, Germany, and Italy and also allowed 
for open trade and tourism (Vehovar). Not only 
was Slovenia open to other countries that were 
developing into strong information societies 
but also these countries were the best in the 
world. Fifteen of the 25 high-access countries 
in the Telecommunication Development Report 
2003 were European countries (“World Tele-
communication…” 2003). In addition to gen-
eral openness, Slovenia established diplomatic 
relations with Germany, another high-access 
country, shortly after independence in 1991. 
Germany accounts for 20 percent of Slovenia’s 
foreign trade and is a principal foreign inves-
tor in Slovenia; 250 companies in Slovenia are 
German or have German participation (“Polit-
ical Relations”). Slovenia’s exposure and ex-
perience doing business with other countries 
had a positive effect on its information society; 
most of its economy was in tune with global 
business standards at the time of independence 
(Vehovar).
Current Status of ICT
 As of 2014, Slovenia is no longer consid-
ered a high-access digital society. In the “World 
Telecommunication Development Report” 
of 2003, Slovenia was tied for 21st place with 
New Zealand, Italy, and France. Slovenia’s ICT 
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ranking has not changed dramatically since it 
was labeled a high-access country in 2003. The 
report, “Measuring the Information Society” of 
2013, ranked Slovenia 28th of 157 countries. 
However, the profile of top ICT countries has 
changed. The top countries in ICT today are no 
longer competing on the basis of access or use 
of ICT services; they all have nearly universal 
access. Rather, the top countries are now striv-
ing for better and faster ICT services and adopt-
ing the latest technologies (“Measuring the In-
formation Society” 2013). By way of contrast, 
Slovenia still struggles with the level of access 
and use of ICT services. Despite its weaknesses 
relative to the highest-tier nations, Slovenia is 
still in the top 20 percent of ICT countries in 
the world and a regional leader in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Slovenia needs to utilize its 
strengths to alleviate its weaknesses to regain 
its position in the top tier of countries in ICT. 
Slovenia’s Strengths in ICT
 Evaluating ICT competency is like tackling 
an artificial rock-climbing wall. The pegs used 
to climb the wall represent areas of ICT where 
the country has strengths. There are myriad 
areas in ICT that a country could develop. For 
example, a country could have a strong e-gov-
ernment program and provide government 
services online, or a country could have afford-
able Internet services. ICT strengths correlate 
with pegs on a rock-climbing wall, because not 
every peg has to be used to climb the wall. Sim-
ilarly, countries do not have to be experts in ev-
erything in ICT to become a highly developed 
information society. At the same time, the more 
pegs available and the bigger the pegs, the eas-
ier it is to climb the wall. Similarly, the more 
strengths a country has in ICT, the easier it is 
to develop an information society. The follow-
ing section describes the “pegs” or strengths 
that Slovenia already has in ICT. Knowledge 
of Slovenia’s current strengths in ICT will 
help determine how Slovenia should further 
advance its ICT competency in the future.
 One way that ICT competence is quanti-
fied is by level of skill. Slovenian citizens have 
above-average ICT skills at all levels of exper-
tise: 82 percent of citizens in Slovenia have 
some level of computer skills, whereas only 67 
percent of citizens in the European Union (EU) 
have some level of computer skills (“Slovenia: 
Internet Usage and Digital Skills”). Slovenia 
also has more high-level computer-skilled 
citizens: 31 percent have high-level skills, 21 
percent medium-level skills, and 12 percent 
low-level computer skills. This compares with 
26 percent, 25 percent, and 16 percent, respec-
tively, for the EU. However, Slovenia is not a 
leader in high-level computer skills; Denmark, 
Finland, and Luxembourg all have 40 percent 
or more of their citizens with high-level ICT 
skills (“Slovenia: Internet Usage and Digital 
Skills”). Yet, the skill set of Slovenian citizens 
has brought the country foreign investors, in-
cluding Aviat Networks, a leader in wireless 
transmission solutions. Aviat decided to build 
one of its research and development teams in 
Slovenia because the location provided access 
to highly educated engineers, according to 
Paul Kennard, senior vice president of prod-
ucts (“ICT: Testimonal”). Additionally, Slovenia 
has an adequate number of citizens trained 
in the field of ICT to support the demand of 
its industry. It is expected that by 2015 there 
will be 900,000 unfilled vacancies for ICT pro-
fessionals in Europe (“Digital Skills and Jobs, 
European Semester”). Slovenia places fourth 
among countries that do not report difficulties 
filling ICT job vacancies, after Germany, Italy, 
and Romania (“Digital Agenda Scoreboard”). 
Essentially, Slovenian companies have an easi-
er time finding qualified employees in ICT; the 
demand for employees, the supply of employ-
ees, and the location of employees all come 
into play when evaluating this metric. 
 Slovenia also ranks high in subsections 
of e-business. According to the European Com-
mission’s Digital Agenda Scoreboard, Slovenia 
has the highest percentage of large enterprises 
(companies with more than 250 employees) 
that utilize an enterprise resource planning 
software (ERP) to integrate internal processes 
in the EU. In Slovenia, 92.3 percent of large 
enterprises use an ERP, while the EU has 72.6 
percent of large enterprises using an ERP. The 
European Commission’s Digital Agenda Score-
board also indicates that Slovenia has the high-
est percentage of large enterprises using an 
automated method to exchange business docu-
ments. In Slovenia, 97.8 percent of large enter-
prises use an automated method to exchange 
business documents whereas in the EU 80.5 
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percent do so (“Digital Agenda Scoreboard”). 
 Slovenia is one of the strongest countries 
in ICT in the Central and Eastern European 
region. This is significant because there is a 
clustered group of countries in the region that 
have not joined the EU: Serbia, Macedonia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania (“List of 
Countries”). Slovenia does not directly share 
a border with the clustered group of non-EU 
countries; however, Slovenia does share a large 
border with the EU’s newest member state, 
Croatia. According to “Measuring the Informa-
tion Society” (2013), Slovenia has a better ICT 
ranking than Croatia and all the other coun-
tries that border the non-EU countries in this 
region, including Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Greece. Slovenia’s regional dominance in 
ICT and its proximity to the emerging market 
make the country an ideal place for technol-
ogy companies looking to invest in the devel-
oping market. A prime example of this is that 
Microsoft invested in an e-governance cen-
ter that was placed in the capital of Slovenia 
in 2008. The center is a partnership between 
southeastern European governments, nongov-
ernmental organizations, and leading technol-
ogy companies. Microsoft aims to utilize this 
center to work with governments, organiza-
tions, and other companies in the region to 
develop technology strategies (“Southeastern 
European Governments …”). Slovenia is set up 
to be a gateway to the emerging markets in the 
Central and Eastern European region. 
 In essence, Slovenia’s ICT strengths have 
a commonality. All are strengths that Slovenia 
can use to attract more investors in any area of 
ICT. Slovenia’s citizens have ICT skills and have 
experience utilizing e-business tools. Slovenia 
is also in close proximity to an emerging market. 
Slovenia’s ICT Weaknesses 
 To continue with the rock-climbing met-
aphor, Slovenia might have several advantages 
in ICT, but it is lacking the pegs on the bottom 
of the wall. For example, Slovenia has excellent 
ICT skills. Therefore, the government is able 
to build a sophisticated government website to 
supply health information to its citizens, but 
not all Slovenian citizens have Internet access. 
Therefore, the service becomes less effective. 
Characteristics like access are fundamental. 
Access must come before citizens can apply 
the technology that will lead to efficiencies. Us-
age is the next step. If the service is available, 
citizens need to be able and willing to use it. 
Slovenia struggles with the ICT basics: access 
and usage—“pegs” that are on the bottom of 
the rock-climbing wall. Therefore, if these ar-
eas are not developed, Slovenia will not be able 
to reach high levels of ICT competencies. 
 Slovenia—once among the world lead-
ers—currently has low access to ICT services 
compared with even average standards, much 
less world-best levels. As of 2012, Slovenia had 
73.6 percent of its households with fixed broad-
band covered whereas the EU had 95.5 percent 
covered. In fact, Slovenia was second to last in 
the EU, behind only Poland. In terms of mobile 
access, Slovenia is comparable to the EU rate 
on third-generation mobile broadband at 96.3 
percent. However, only 36.9 percent of the pop-
ulation has access to fourth-generation mobile 
broadband, whereas 54.5 percent of the EU is 
covered. Indeed, the European Commission 
has advised that the Slovenian government 
invest in ICT infrastructure (“Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard”). 
 Slovenia also struggles with usage of ICT. 
Usage of ICT can include a variety of services 
but is commonly quantified by Internet use. 
Slovenia is below the EU average of “regular” 
Internet use (at least once a week); 65 percent 
of the Slovenian population uses the Internet 
regularly while 70 percent of the EU uses the 
Internet regularly. Slovenia is even further 
away from the usage rate of leading countries 
that have 90 percent of the population regu-
larly using the Internet. Slovenia’s low usage 
stems from high prices for ICT services (“Slo-
venia: Internet Usage and Digital Skills”). ICT 
services have to be affordable for people to use 
them. Slovenia was ranked 40th in the ICT 
Price Basket index, which measures the price 
for fixed telephony, mobile cellular telephony, 
and fixed broadband (“Measuring the Informa-
tion Society 2011…”). The ranking translates 
to fixed broadband being twice as expensive in 
Slovenia as in Sweden. For example, in 2013, 
for fixed broadband stand-alone Internet access 
in Slovenia (with advertised download speeds 
of at least 8 and below 12 megabits per second), 
the price was €43.50 per month compared 
to Sweden’s €18.90 (“Digital Agenda Score-
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board”). Slovenia clearly needs to reduce its 
ICT service prices before it can increase usage. 
Reasons for Slovenia’s Weaknesses in 
ICT
 Telekom Slovenije is the dominant play-
er in Slovenia’s telecommunication market. 
However, the company is resisting competitive 
price pressures and is driving competitors out 
of the market. In its Annual Report for 2013, 
Telekom Slovenije explains it has maintained 
the highest overall market shares in Slovenia 
in several sectors. For example, Telekom Slo-
venije has 37 percent of the market share for 
fixed broadband access. In this sector Telekom 
Slovenije is competing with Telemach, T-2, and 
Amis (“Annual Report 2013”), although Amis, 
with ten percent of the Slovenian Internet ser-
vices market, one component of fixed broad-
band access, was squeezed out of the market 
and recently put itself up for sale (“Slovenia’s 
Amis Up for Sale”). Telekom Slovenije is also 
the leader in the mobile telephone market, 
where it competes with Tušmobil, T-2, and new 
operators Telemach and Amis. Essentially Tele-
kom Slovenije, the former monopoly, has suc-
cessfully held on to its market power. It is the 
lack of a competitive market that is driving the 
high prices and lack of infrastructure. 
 The evidence from other national ICT 
markets suggests that a competitive ICT mar-
ket sparks private investment in infrastructure 
and lower prices. For example, much like Slo-
venia, the U.S. suffered from limited service 
when the Bell System was a monopolistic pow-
er (Adelmann). However, after 13 years of com-
petition, telephone service became available 
almost everywhere in the country (Adelmann). 
Competition not only increases availability of 
services but also improves service offerings 
(Battersby and Yeates). Sweden achieved the 
highest percentage of fixed broadband sub-
scriptions with at least 100 megabits per sec-
ond (“Digital Agenda Scoreboard”). It is be-
lieved that Sweden was able to reach that level 
of access through its reliance on private mar-
ket players to invest in infrastructure (“ICT for 
Everyone…”). Competition not only improves 
services but also lowers prices for consumers in 
the telecommunications industry (Adelmann). 
For instance Australia, after splitting up its 
telecom (Telstra) in 2012, saw competitors 
fight for market share through lower prices. 
The cheapest monthly phone and Internet plan 
offered by a sub-company of the original tele-
com monopoly was $80, whereas one compet-
itor’s (Optus) lowest offering was $65 a month 
and another’s (Exetel) was $35 (Battersby and 
Yeates). Essentially, the experience in the U.S., 
Sweden, and elsewhere suggests that Slove-
nia’s problem areas in ICT—low infrastructure 
and high prices—can be alleviated through the 
forces and incentives leashed by a competitive 
market. Slovenia could become an even more 
advanced information society if it continued to 
liberalize the market, in other words, open the 
market to competition (“World Telecommuni-
cation…” 2003). Yet Slovenia has instead failed 
to create a competitive environment because 
the market is not privatized or regulated for 
competition. 
 On paper, at least, Slovenia liberalized its 
telecommunications market in 2001 by allow-
ing competition to enter the market. Howev-
er, Telekom Slovenije and the Slovenian gov-
ernment have continuously been accused of 
intentionally stifling competition. A number 
of lawsuits have been brought against Tele-
kom Slovenije for violating competition rules 
(Hosman and Howard). For example, in 2007 
T-2 filed a claim against Telekom Slovenije 
that the company prevented it from entering 
the Internet services market. Six years later, 
T-2 was allowed to make its case in court. Af-
ter an hour and a half, the case was dismissed 
because the court felt that T-2 lacked evidence, 
even though 3,000 pages of written materials 
and more than 5,000 pieces of evidence were 
provided during the six-year period. In anoth-
er case, Telekom Slovenije successfully argued 
that it did not cause any damage to its compet-
itors by not letting them enter the market but 
that its actions were beneficial for competitors 
because it protected them from entering mar-
kets where they would incur losses (“Competi-
tion Protection...”). The regulatory body to en-
sure telecom sector competition, APEK (Post 
and Electronic Communications Agency), has 
also been charged with anti-competitive behav-
ior. For example, APEK has been accused of im-
properly transferring its responsibilities to the 
Competition Protection Office, which oversees 
competition in Slovenia’s industries (Hosman 
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and Howard). The Competition Protection Of-
fice has significantly fewer staff members than 
APEK; therefore, transferring cases to this of-
fice will effectively postpone the case. Although 
legally competition is allowed in the telecom-
munications market of Slovenia, Telekom Slo-
venije effectively controls the market. 
 Privatization is key to developing a com-
petitive market because it signals a commit-
ment to pro-market reforms and attracts private 
investment (Li and Xu). Yet, as of mid-2014, 
the Slovenian government still owns a ma-
jority stake in the largest supplier of telecom-
munications, Telekom Slovenije. More than a 
decade has passed since the top ten countries 
with the highest ICT Development Index (the 
current index for evaluating ICT in the “World 
Telecommunication Development Report”) 
privatized their telecommunications markets 
(“Measuring the Information Society 2013”). 
When other countries started to privatize, Slo-
venia passed a law that gave exclusive monop-
oly rights to Telekom Slovenije for both voice 
and data telephone until the end of 2000 (Hos-
man and Howard). To some degree, Slovenia’s 
hesitation to privatize was grounded in quasi- 
socialist ideals; Slovenia was previously a part of 
socialist Yugoslavia. However, despite convert-
ing to capitalism in the early 1990s, Slovenia 
has held on to myriad state-owned enterpris-
es (Rousek). In fact, Slovenia is the only post- 
Yugoslavia nation that has not privatized the 
telecom monopoly it inherited (Hosman and 
Howard). It made plans to sell its telecom mo-
nopoly in 1999 and later again in 2005. Unfor-
tunately, it missed the best time to sell. The 
market value of telecommunications firms de-
creased significantly after the dot-com bubble 
burst in 2000 and 2001 (“Telekom Slovenije…”). 
Investors who bought shares of France Telecom 
and Deutsche Telekom realized considerable 
losses after their purchases (“Coming Home 
to Roost”). Slovenia decided not to sell because 
the market value went down dramatically. 
During a second attempt to privatize in 2006, 
Slovenia listed shares on the Ljubljana Stock 
Exchange (“Telekom Slovenije…”). Slovenia 
received offers for the remaining portion of the 
business but again cancelled the sale because 
it was not satisfied with the price of the bids.
 In 2013, the Slovenian government re-
luctantly, but voluntarily, approved the pri-
vatization of Telekom Slovenije along with 14 
other government-owned entities. The gov-
ernment decided to privatize the companies 
in order to raise money to bail out Slovenia’s 
government-controlled banks. The three larg-
est banks have a combined $9.2 billion in 
non-performing loans—an amount equivalent 
to 20 percent of Slovenia’s annual economic 
output. The non-performing loans had been 
used to fund businesses owned by the Slove-
nian government. The root problem that re-
sulted in the non-performing loans, according 
to economists and bankers, is that the Slove-
nian government attempted to prevent foreign 
ownership of the businesses. The banks loaned 
capital to financially weak businesses owned 
by the Slovenian government (Rousek). As of 
mid-2014, the privatization remains pending, 
but Slovenia has several buyers interested in 
Telekom Slovenije. Interested parties include 
Deutsche Telekom and private equity groups 
Providence Equity Partners, Cinven, CVC, and 
Blackstone and Bain. Norway’s Telenor and 
Russia’s MTS were originally interested but did 
not place bids. The majority stake that Slove-
nia is selling is valued at more than €700 mil-
lion ($971 million) (“Deutsche Telekom Lined 
Up…”). However, the value that privatization 
could bring to the telecommunications indus-
try is much more. Privatization is a significant 
factor that will determine the competitiveness 
of the Slovenian market. 
Prognosis
 Based on this diagnosis, Slovenia’s top 
priority should be to facilitate the creation of 
a competitive ICT sector. Experiences in oth-
er nations suggest that competition will allow 
Slovenia to increase its ICT infrastructure 
and decrease prices in the market, which will 
prompt increased usage of and access to ICT 
and ultimately allow Slovenia to take advan-
tage of the productivity benefits that come with 
an information society. Telekom Slovenije’s de 
facto monopoly position is the number one 
barrier to a competitive market. Unfortunate-
ly, the upcoming sale of Telekom Slovenije in 
itself poses a threat to creating a competitive 
market: selling Telekom Slovenije could simply 
transfer the de facto monopoly to another en-
tity. Other former Yugoslavia countries have 
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had problems creating a competitive market 
after privatizing their telecom monopolies. 
Montenegro privatized its telecom, T-Crnogor-
ski, in 2004, but did not see improvements in 
competition until the government reduced the 
fee on international traffic from €100,000 to 
€1,000 in 2007. Moreover, seven years later, the 
original monopoly continues to dominate the 
market. Croatia has also experienced problems 
creating a competitive market after privatizing. 
Deutsche Telekom purchased 35 percent of the 
Croatian telecom, Hrvatske Telecomunikacije 
(later called Hrvatski Telekom) (HT) in 1999 
and then acquired a majority stake in 2001. HT 
retained near monopoly status because it was 
not required to share physical wires with other 
operators, provide customers the ability to se-
lect the operator, or provide the ability to keep 
telephone numbers regardless of provider until 
January 1, 2005. Croatia stimulated competi-
tion by reducing the cost of acquiring a fixed 
line license. The country saw immediate, albe-
it limited, results: two licenses were awarded. 
Croatia also replaced its regulatory authority 
with a new one that was self-financed and not 
for profit (Hosman and Howard). Despite these 
efforts to create a competitive environment, 
HT maintained its leading position in the Cro-
atian telecommunications market across all 
areas of operation in 2013. The company indi-
cated in its annual report that competition was 
becoming more intense (“Market Overview”). 
Clearly, privatization alone is not enough to 
create a competitive environment with these 
former Yugoslavia monopolies. Slovenia needs 
to take action to ensure that Telekom Slovenije 
does not remain a monopoly regardless of the 
owner. 
 Slovenia’s past and the experience of oth-
er former Yugoslav countries’ privatizations of 
their respective telecoms suggest that Slovenia 
should not sell Telekom Slovenije as a whole 
company. Rather, Slovenia should split up the 
telecom and sell its parts, in effect ending the 
monopoly. Neither Montenegro nor Croatia 
was able to successfully reduce its own monop-
oly’s market share below that of competitors, 
and both countries took additional actions be-
yond privatization to stimulate competition. In 
light of Slovenia’s regulatory experience with 
Telekom Slovenije, Slovenia would need a lot of 
work to increase investor confidence that this 
is a market in which competition will thrive 
and where the old monopoly would not be capa-
ble of stifling new entrants. Slovenia’s current 
strengths are potentially attractive to investors 
in all areas of ICT. In turn, ICT investors could 
help Slovenia boost its ICT competency. For 
example, an investor could either bring new 
technology to the market or hire and train Slo-
venian citizens. However, Slovenia’s strengths 
could be temporary. It could lose its regional 
lead, and the reduction in ICT education after 
the late 1990s could diminish citizens’ ICT skill 
levels in years to come. Additionally, ICT inves-
tors outside of telecommunications are relying 
on citizens’ access and usage, which are pro-
jected to increase after the split of the telecom. 
For example, a company providing an e-com-
merce service is dependent on citizens’ ability 
to access the Internet. Therefore, there is value 
in accelerating the process by eliminating the 
monopoly and splitting Telekom Slovenije into 
smaller companies. 
 Slovenia would not be the first country 
to split a telecom to create a more competitive 
market. The Bell System, the U.S.’s de facto 
telecom monopoly, was broken up into seven 
independent companies in 1984. The breakup 
successfully led to more competition in the 
long distance telecommunications market 
(Kushnick). Australia split its telecom, Tel-
stra, in 2012, but regretted not doing it earlier. 
Broadband Minister Stephen Conroy explained 
that the structural separation would finally 
create an even playing field and said that they 
should have split Telstra when they privatized 
20 years ago (Battersby and Yeates). Austra-
lian Competition and Consumer Commission 
chairman Rod Sims agreed, stating that if 
Telstra had separated earlier the industry 
would be more competitive today (Ludlow and 
McDuling). Slovenia should not make the same 
mistake as Australia and should split Telekom 
Slovenije now.
Conclusion 
 ICT is a catalyst for growth. It stimulates 
the economy because technology spawns pro-
ductivity. Slovenia is not reaching its full po-
tential in ICT, which means that it is not reach-
ing its full potential economically. Fortunately, 
Slovenia has the opportunity to reboot its ICT 
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competency by breaking up its historic telecom 
monopoly, Telekom Slovenije, and selling the 
pieces. A free competitive market would in-
crease access and lower prices of ICT services, 
allowing Slovenia to climb to the top of ICT 
competency and fully develop an information 
society. There are many pieces to move in the 
strategic game of the world economy. ICT is 
the piece Slovenia should move forward. 
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